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ABSTRACT
Lack of effective corporate governance mechanism and disclosure transparency frameworks have been partly blamed 
for the 1997-1999 East Asia economic crises. Consequently, Indonesia, together with many countries across the globe 
have been actively reviewing and improving their corporate governance and transparency mechanisms. Theoretically, 
corporate governance mechanism is designed to monitor and evaluate decisions made by managers in the management 
of a company to reduce agency cost and information asymmetry between the shareholders and the management. The main 
objective of the study is to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanism on the level of voluntary disclosure in 
Indonesia, a country that has adopted a two-tier board system. The two-tier board system is considered a better system 
compared to one tier board system since all members of the board are non-executives. Therefore, the board members 
are more independent and objective in supervising and monitoring the performance of executive managers. This study 
investigates four corporate governance variables which are expected to influence the level of voluntary disclosure; (1) 
composition of independent members of Board of Commissioners (BOC), (2) composition of family members on the BOC, 
(3) audit quality, and (4) managerial ownership. The sample consists of companies listed on Bursa Saham Indonesia 
for the year ended 2008. The influence of corporate governance on the level of voluntary disclosure is analyzed using 
multiple regression method. As expected, the results show that the compositions of independent BOC and auditor’s 
quality have a positive and significant relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure. Meanwhile, the composition of 
family members on the BOC has negatively influenced the disclosure. The results suggest that the corporate governance 
structure in a two-tier board system, specifically in Indonesia, is not significantly different from a one tier board system 
in influencing the level of voluntary disclosure.
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ABSTRAK
Kekurangan mekanisme tadbir urus korporat yang berkesan serta kerangka pelaporan yang kurang telus telah dikatakan 
antara penyebab kepada krisis ekonomi di Asia Timur pada tahun 1997-1999. Oleh itu Indonesia, bersama dengan 
beberapa negara lain di seluruh dunia, telah mengkaji dan memperbaiki mekanisme tadbir urus korporat serta ketelusan 
secara aktif. Secara teorinya, mekanisme tadbir urus korporat dibangunkan untuk memantau dan menilai keputusan 
yang dibuat oleh pengurus dalam pengurusan syarikat bagi mengurangkan kos agensi dan ketaksamarataan maklumat 
antara pemegang saham dengan pihak pengurusan. Objektif utama kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji kesan tadbir 
urus korporat kepada tahap pendedahan maklumat sukarela di Indonesia, sebuah negara yang mengamalkan sistem 
dua lembaga pengarah. Sistem dua lembaga pengarah adalah sistem yang lebih baik berbanding sistem satu lembaga 
pengarah kerana semua ahli lembaga pengarah adalah bukan eksekutif. Oleh itu, ahli adalah lebih bebas and objektif 
untuk menyelia dan mengawal prestasi pengurus eksekutif. Kajian ini mengkaji empat pembolehubah tadbir urus korporat 
yang dijangka mempengaruhi tahap pendedahan sukarela; (1) kebebasan ahli Lembaga Pengarah Komisoris (ALP), (2) 
komposisi ahli keluarga dalam ALP, (3) kualiti audit, dan (4) pemilikan saham oleh pihak pengurusan. Sampel kajian 
terdiri daripada syarikat yang tersenarai di Bursa Saham Indonesia pada tahun 2008. Kesan tadbir urus korporat terhadap 
pendedahan secara sukarela telah diuji dengan menggunakan kaedah regresi berganda. Seperti yang dijangkakan, hasil 
kajian menunjukkan komposisi ahli ALP yang bebas dan kualiti audit berhubungan secara positif dan signifikan dengan 
tahap pendedahan sukarela. Sementara itu, komposisi ahli keluarga dalam ALP berhubungan secara negatif dengan 
tahap pendedahan tersebut. Dapatan menunjukkan bahawa struktur tadbir urus korporat dalam sistem dua lembaga 
pengarah, khususnya di Indonesia, tidak jauh berbeza daripada sistem satu lembaga pengarah dalam mempengaruhi 
tahap pendedahan sukarela.
Kata kunci: Tadbir urus korporat; pendedahan sukarela; lembaga pengarah komisoris
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INTRODUCTION
Lack of effective corporate governance mechanism 
and disclosure transparency framework in majority of 
capital markets and companies has been partly blamed 
for the 1997-1999 East Asia economic crises. Among the 
weaknesses identified include weak financial structure of 
many companies, over-leveraging, lack of transparency 
in disclosure and accountability, existence of a complex 
system of family control companies and little or no 
effective laws to ensure that controlling shareholders and 
management treat small investors fairly and equitably 
(Khoo 2003). Consequently, many countries across the 
globe have been actively reviewing and improving their 
regulatory framework, in particular corporate governance 
and transparency mechanisms. The concept of corporate 
governance was initially introduced in Indonesia in 1999 
with the establishment of the National Committee on 
Corporate Governance (NCCG) (KNKG 2006) to develop 
the Indonesian Code of Corporate Governance. In 2000, 
the NCCG published the Indonesian Code of Corporate 
Governance (Code) which was later revised in 2006. 
The main objective of the Code is to maximize corporate 
and shareholders’ value by enhancing transparency, 
accountability, reliability, responsibility, and fairness; to 
encourage the management of companies to behave in a 
professional, transparent, and efficient manner; and, to 
encourage shareholders and members of the Board to make 
decisions and to act in compliance with the prevailing 
regulations.
The adoption of good corporate governance 
mechanisms by a company is pertinent since it can help 
reduce agency cost and therefore, ensuring that managers 
act in the best interests of shareholders (Haniffa & Cooke 
2002). Moreover, the adoption of good governance 
mechanisms would also strengthen the internal control 
of companies and provide intensive monitoring to 
curb opportunistic behaviours and reduce information 
asymmetry (Leftwich et al. 1981). Under such an 
intensive-monitoring environment, managers are not likely 
to withhold information for their own benefits, which lead 
to improvement in disclosure comprehensiveness and 
quality of financial reporting (Ho & Wong 2003).
Past studies have documented evidence that good 
corporate governance practices can positively increase 
the corporate transparency practices via the increase in the 
level of voluntary disclosure (for examples see, Haniffa 
& Cooke 2002; Ghazali & Weetman 2006; Ho & Wong 
2003; Gul & Leung 2004; Eng & Mak 2003; Chau & Gray 
2002; Arcay & Vazquez 2005; Wang et al. 2008; Donnely 
& Mulcahy 2008). Specifically, past studies have found 
that independence of directors (Ho & Wong 2001) and 
quality audit (Wang et al. 2008) have a positive effect on 
the level of voluntary disclosure. Past studies also have 
found that composition of family members on the board 
(Haniffa & Cooke 2002) and management ownership (Eng 
& Mak 2003) negatively influences the level of voluntary 
disclosure.
However, these findings need to be carefully 
interpreted, and cannot be generalized across countries 
since different countries may have different regulatory and 
corporate governance mechanisms, especially with regards 
to board system. Presently, there are two types of board 
system adopted by countries around the world; the one tier 
board system, and the two-tier board system. Examples of 
countries that adopt the one tier board system are Malaysia, 
Hong Kong and the US. Examples of countries that adopt 
a two-tier board system are Indonesia, Netherland and 
Germany. All of the studies that have been previously 
mentioned have examined the impact of corporate 
governance practices on the level of voluntary disclosure 
in countries that adopted a one tier board system. Examples 
include a study in the UK by Jungman (2006), Malaysia by 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Ghazali et al. (2006), Hong 
Kong by Ho and Wong (2001), Singapore by Eng and 
Mak (2003), China by Wang et al. (2008), Saudi Arabia 
by Alsaeed (2006) and Ireland by Donelly and Mulcahy 
(2008). However, the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and the level of voluntary disclosure 
in countries implementing the two tiers board system 
has not been fully investigated. Therefore, the unique 
corporate governance framework in Indonesia provides 
an opportunity to extend earlier works on the relationship 
between corporate governance practices and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. The relationship between these two 
variables is expected to be stronger in a two tier board 
system since all members of board are nonexecutive. They 
can execute their duties more effectively and demand 
more voluntary disclosure to outside investors (Donelly 
& Mulcahy 2008). Consequently, the agency cost will be 
lower in a two tier board system. 
Specifically, the purpose of this study is to investigate 
the corporate governance characteristics of Indonesian 
companies and their influence on the level of voluntary 
disclosure. As expected, the results show that independent 
composition of the Board of Commissioners (BOC) and 
audit quality have a positive and significant association 
with the level of voluntary disclosure. Meanwhile, the 
composition of family members has negatively influenced 
the disclosure. The findings provide further insight and 
understanding on the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and the level of voluntary disclosure, 
specifically in a country that adopts a two tier board 
system.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. 
The next section looks at the institutional background in 
Indonesia followed by a review of the literature, hypothesis 
development, research methodology and findings. Finally, 
conclusions and implications of the study are presented 
in the last section.
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INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
TWO-TIER BOARD SYSTEM IN INDONESIA
The Indonesian Company Law of 1995 is the most 
important framework for the current legislation on 
corporate governance in Indonesia. Under the Law, a 
company is a separate legal entity with two tiers board 
consisting of the Board of Directors (BOD), and the Board 
of Commissioners (BOC). Each member of the BOC and 
BOD is appointed by shareholders during the company’s 
Annual General Meeting (AGM). 
The BOC consists of affiliated commissioners and 
independent commissioners (KNKG 2006). Affiliated 
commissioners are family members of major shareholders 
or business associates of major shareholders or the 
company, while independent commissioners are members 
with no family or business ties to major shareholders or 
the company. All BOC members are non-executive as they 
cannot hold any executive duties in an organization. The 
role BOC is to supervise and advise the BOD on the running 
of the company. The BOC is also required by the Law to 
carry out, in good faith and with full responsibility, its 
duties in the best interests of the company. Furthermore, 
the BOC has to keep an eye on the effectiveness of Good 
Corporate Governance practices under which the company 
operates and make changes as needed. In ensuring that 
members of the BOC are able to perform their duties 
independently and objectively, they are prohibited from 
holding any executive role. Additionally, by virtue of the 
Company Law, each member must also disclose any equity 
interests that they or their family have in the company or 
other companies.
On the other hand, the BOD is fully responsible for the 
management of the company. Each member of the BOD is 
fully and personally liable if he/she is at fault or fails to 
perform his/her tasks in good faith and with a full sense 
of the responsibility for the interest and business of the 
company. The BOD must administer the company’s books 
of accounts, prepare and submit to the AGM an Annual 
Report and annual financial statement as well as establish 
and maintain a Register of Shareholders and Minutes of the 
AGM. By virtue of Article 87 of the Company Law, each 
member must also disclose any shareholding interests held 
by them respectively or by his/her family in the company 
or other companies. The two tier board systems adopted in 
Indonesia and the one tier board system adopted by other 
countries is depicted in Figure 1 as follows.
FIGURE 1. Two-tier and one tier board systems
Shareholders Shareholders
Two Tier Boards System One Tier Board System
Board of Directors
Board of Directors
Board of Commissioners
Managers/Administrators Managers/Administrators
According to Jungmann (2006), the two-tier 
governance structure is considered better since all 
members of the BOC cannot hold any executive position 
and are not involved in the operations of the company. 
Thus, they can be more independent and objective in 
supervising and monitoring the performance of the BOD. 
This is a contrasting scenario to the one tier governance 
system in which members of the BOD can hold executive 
and non-executive positions. Under these circumstances, 
it is perceived that members of the BOD cannot be 
completely objective and independent in monitoring and 
assessing the performance of the management team, since 
they may also be a part of the management team. This 
study is carried to investigate whether the different role 
played by BOC members in a two tier board system can 
significantly influence the level of voluntary disclosure. 
This result would provide an additional understanding of 
how different governance mechanism (one tier or two tier 
system) is different or similar in the relationship between 
corporate governance characteristics and voluntary 
disclosure practices of a company. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT
INDEPENDENCE OF BOC AND THE LEVEL 
OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
The effectiveness of a board in monitoring the management 
is determined by its composition, independence, and size 
(John & Senbet 1998). Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest 
that the higher the composition of the independent 
directors, the more effective it will be in monitoring 
managerial opportunism. Additionally such companies can 
be expected to have more voluntary disclosures. Forker 
(1992) finds that the presence of independent members on 
boards enhanced financial disclosure quality and reduced 
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the benefits of withholding information. Therefore, a 
higher percentage of independent directors on the board 
results in more effective execution of duties and greater 
demand of voluntary disclosure to outside investors 
(Donelly & Mulcahy 2008) as well as reduced agency 
cost and information asymmetry between principals and 
agents of the firm (Chen & Jaggi 2000).
In Indonesia, because members of the BOC are 
non-executive members, they are expected to be more 
effective monitors compared to the BOD members in a 
one tier board system. However, in certain instances, 
members of the BOC in Indonesian companies may not 
be completely independent since they are appointed due 
to their affiliation with major shareholders, or with the 
company itself. However, their level of ‘independence’ is 
still expected to be higher than the level of ‘independence’ 
of BOD in a one tier system.
Past studies have found evidence of a positive 
relationship between the composition of independent 
directors and the level of voluntary disclosure (Ghazali 
& Weetman 2006; Ho & Wong 2001; Chen & Jaggi 
2000; Cheng & Courtenay 2006; Donnelly & Mulcahy 
2008; Arcay & Vazquez 2005). Therefore, this study also 
predicts that the composition of independent directors 
in the BOC would have a positive impact on the level 
voluntary disclosure of Indonesian companies as stated 
in Hypothesis 1 as follows:
H1 Composition of independent directors in BOC 
is positively related to the level of voluntary 
disclosure
QUALITY OF AUDITORS AND LEVEL OF VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE
The main role of external auditors is to monitor and 
ensure that the management has complied with the rules 
and laws of the home country (Kurniawan & Indriantoro 
2000). Auditing reduces information asymmetries between 
management and external stakeholders as it allows an 
independent external party to verify the validity of the 
content of financial statements (Wang et al. 2008). This 
external independent process is particularly important 
to corporate governance and the oversight of companies 
(Francis et al. 1999). In addition, external auditors also 
inspect and evaluate the annual report and provide 
quality assessment of companies’ disclosure (Barako 
et al. 2006). Moreover, according to Gul and Leung 
(2004) auditors that are concerned about preserving their 
reputation will strongly encourage clients to provide a 
more comprehensive disclosure.
Past studies have shown a strong correlation between 
audit firm size and audit quality (Francis et al. 1999; 
Krishnan 2003). A higher quality audit is associated 
with higher likelihood of discovering material errors and 
irregularities and having discovered these errors, the higher 
likelihood of reporting them. According to Wallace et al. 
(1994), companies represented by big international audit 
firms are likely to provide quality disclosure in their annual 
reports than companies who are not. Furthermore, auditors 
of bigger sized audit firms are more knowledgeable and 
skillful and are more capable of limiting and reducing 
opportunistic behavior of the firm’s managers (Francis et 
al. 1999; Krishnan 2003).  
Studies by Gul and Leung (2004) and Agca and 
Onder (2007) find a positive relationship between auditor 
quality and the level of voluntary disclosure of large-sized 
organizations. This finding is supported by O’Sullivan et 
al. (2008) and Wang et al. (2008). In line with previous 
findings, this study expects audit quality to have a positive 
impact on the level of voluntary disclosure by Indonesian 
companies, hypothesized as follows:
H2 Quality of the auditors is positively related to the level 
of voluntary disclosure.
COMPOSITION OF FAMILY MEMBERS ON BOC AND LEVEL 
OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
Family owned businesses and family ownership are very 
common in the East Asia region (Chau & Gray 2002). 
Hence, having family members on the BOD or BOC is also 
a common occurrence. According to Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006), having family members on the board can reduce 
agency problems since family members are likely to 
have good knowledge about their firms’ activities, which 
enables them to provide superior monitoring of managers 
(Ghazali & Weetman 2006). Moreover, family members 
with equity interest in companies tend to have much longer 
investment horizons as compared to other investors. Thus, 
families help mitigate myopic investment decisions by 
managers (Kwak 2003).
The presence of family members on the BOD is 
believed to have an impact on the practice of voluntary 
disclosure (Haniffa & Cooke 2002). Since family members 
may have easier access to internal information, the need 
for additional reporting and disclosure will be less. This 
will result in a low voluntary disclosure by management. 
Past studies have reported a negative relationship between 
the presence of family members on the BOD and the level 
of voluntary disclosure in countries that adopted a one 
tier board governance system such as Hong Kong (Ho & 
Wong 2001) and Malaysia (Haniffa & Cooke 2002). This 
study predicts that the nature of the relationship between 
the compositions of family members on the Indonesian 
BOC with the level of voluntary disclosure will also be 
negative. The hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3 Composition of family members in the BOC 
is negatively related to the level of voluntary 
disclosure.
MANAGEMENT OWNERSHIP AND THE LEVEL VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE
Ideally, managers choose investment project that will 
maximize shareholders wealth (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
Sometimes, this is not the case as managers may have 
conflicting objectives and use companies’ resources to 
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increase their own wealth at the expense of shareholders’ 
wealth. Equity ownership by management could help 
mitigate such conflict and align interests of management 
and shareholders (Warfield et al. 1995). Thus, the extent 
of managerial ownership affects the degree of congruence 
between the interests of owners and management (Jensen 
& Meckling 1976). The fundamental problem lies in 
the fact that there exists imperfect information between 
managers and shareholders, which creates a moral hazard 
problem, since shareholders cannot verify whether the 
good performance is due to luck or hard work. Therefore, 
reporting of financial information is one way to monitor 
manager’s activities (Hossain et al. 1994).
The reporting of voluntary information in annual 
reports is under the discretion of the management. There 
will be less need for detailed reporting if managers hold 
considerable percentage of ownership in the companies, 
as they can obtain the information needed directly from 
the organization. As stated by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), the greater the percentage of stocks owned by 
top management, the more likely it will be that they will 
make decisions consistent with maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth. Existing literature provides evidence of the 
negative relationship between ownership by managers 
and the quality of disclosure (Gelb 2000; Eng & Mak 
2003: Ghazali & Weetman 2006). Eng and Mak (2003) 
for instance, examine the relationship between ownership 
structure and board of director composition with the level 
of voluntary disclosure. The ownership structures are 
based on ownership by the management, block ownership 
and government ownership. The results show that 
management ownership relates negatively with the level 
of disclosure. Ghazali and Weetman (2006) also find that 
companies with high proportion of shares held by their 
executive directors disclose less voluntary information 
in their annual reports. These findings suggest that when 
management shareholding is high, the level of voluntary 
disclosure is low. In line with previous findings, this study 
expects managerial share ownership to have a negative 
relationship with the level of voluntary disclosure as stated 
in Hypothesis 4 as follows:
H4 Level of management ownership is negatively related 
to the level of voluntary disclosure.
METHODOLOGY
This study uses secondary data obtained from annual 
reports of Indonesia companies listed on Bursa Saham 
Indonesia (the stock exchange of Indonesia). Data reported 
in the 2008 annual report are gathered since it is the 
most recent annual report available online. Specifically, 
data collected from annual reports are data on voluntary 
disclosure, composition of independent directors on the 
BOC, number of family members on the BOC, type of 
external audit, and other related financial information.
MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES
The level of voluntary disclosure is determined based 
on 85 voluntary disclosure items proposed by Meek and 
Roberts (1995). The items have been used in previous 
studies to investigate the level of voluntary disclosure 
in Asian countries such as in Singapore and Malaysia 
(Eng & Mak 2003; Haniffa & Cooke 2002; Ghazali & 
Weetman 2006). In addition, this study also reviews 35 
voluntary disclosure items recommended by the Capital 
Market Supervisory Agency of Indonesia (BAPEPAM 
2006). The combined items by Meek and Roberts (1995) 
and BAPEPAM are piloted to ascertain the suitability 
of the items to disclosure by Indonesian companies. 
Specifically, ten1 annual reports of selected Indonesia 
companies are reviewed and subsequently, 28 disclosure 
items are removed. The disclosure items removed are 
considered inappropriate or irrelevant. Additionally, items 
listed as mandatory disclosure items based on listing and 
accounting standards requirements, are also eliminated. 
This brings the final number of 80 items that make up the 
final disclosure items.2
The level of voluntary disclosure is measured based 
on disclosure score index. Past studies have used two 
types of disclosure score indexes; weighted index and 
unweighted index (Chau & Gray 2002). The weighted 
disclosure index is used when certain items are considered 
more important than others and therefore given a higher 
score (Alsaeed 2006). On the other hand, the unweighted 
disclosure index is used when each disclosure item is 
considered equally important, thus given the same scores 
(Luo et al. 2004). The application of weighted disclosure 
index poses addition problem due to subjectivity involved 
in determining the importance of each item. Therefore, 
this study uses the unweighted disclosure index approach. 
Moreover it has been proven that, statistically there 
is no significant difference between the weighted and 
unweighted disclosure index (Chau & Gray 2002). 
A score of 1 is given if a particular disclosure item 
is disclosed and a score of 0 is given if the item is not 
disclosed. If a particular disclosure item is not relevant 
to a sample company, a ‘non applicable’ (NA) symbol is 
given to indicate that this particular disclosure item will 
not be included to calculate the total disclosure index. 
The voluntary disclosure index is calculated based on 
the ratio of total possible items disclosed by the company 
divided with all the possible disclosure items. The level 
of disclosure index (DI) for each company is calculated 
as follows:
1
1
nj
ij
j t  
DI XN= ∑
=
where DI = Disclosure Index,
 Nj = Total possible disclosure items, and
 Xij = Actual number of possible items. 
Other variables of interest are the composition 
of independent directors on the BOC, audit quality, 
composition of family member on the BOC, and managerial 
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ownership of a company. The composition of independent 
directors on the BOC is measured based on the proportion 
of independent directors divided by the total number of 
BOC (Nugrahadi 2008). Information on the proportion of 
independent directors on the BOC is obtained from the 
annual reports.
Audit quality is measured by determining whether 
companies are audited by large audit firms (Big 4) or 
small audit firms (Non Big 4). A score of 1 is given if a 
company is audited by Big 4 audit firms and a score of 
0 given if otherwise (Wang et al. 2006). To determine 
the audit quality in the Indonesian scenario, the study 
also incorporates companies that are audited by local 
audit firms (normally known as Juru Audit) that have an 
affiliation with the international Big 4 audit firms. The 
nature of their affiliation is shown as follows:
1. Juru Audit Purwanrtono, Suherman & Surga (affiliated 
to Ernest & Young) 
2. Juru Audit Osman Bing Satrio (affiliated to Deloitte 
Touche Tohmatsu) 
3. Juru Audit Siddharta and Widjaja (affiliated to 
KPMG) 
4. Juru Audit Tanudireja, Wibisana & Partners (affiliated 
to Price Waterhouse Coopers) 
In line with the Corporate Governance Codes issued 
by the NCCG, members of BOC may consist of independent 
commissioners and affiliated commissioners. Affiliated 
commissioners are directors who may have family 
relationship with major shareholders (KNKG 2006). In 
this study, the presence of family members on the BOC 
is measured based on the ratio of family members on the 
BOC to the total number of BOC members. This measure 
is often used in past studies to account for the family 
members on the board of directors (Ho & Wong 2001; 
Ghazali & Weetman 2006).
Management ownership is measured based on 
the percentage of direct ownership by the members of 
BOD. This measure has been used by previous studies to 
account for the managerial ownership (Eng & Mak 2003; 
Nugrahadi 2008). Information about management equity 
ownership is obtained from the annual reports.
There are other variables expected to influence the 
level of voluntary disclosure and have been frequently 
studied in the past. These variables are size, profitability 
and leverage which are incorporated as control variables in 
this study. Previous studies have used a number of proxies 
for size. This study uses total asset as a measure of size 
(Romlah et al. 2002). Profitability is based on the ratio 
between net income and total sales (Chau & Gray 2002), 
while leverage is measured based on total liabilities over 
total assets (Eng & Mak 2003).
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
The sample for this study is drawn from 212 companies 
listed on Bursa Saham Indonesia in 2008. The sample 
excludes 22 companies from the financial sectors as these 
companies have their own reporting requirements and 
would have different reporting incentives. Additionally, 
86 companies are also excluded due to data downloading 
failure and incomplete data. This brings the final sample 
to 104 companies, representing six industrial sectors as 
detailed out in Table 1. 
TABLE 1. Sample by industry
 Industry Frequency Percentage
 Mining 5 4.81
 Basic  4 3.85
 Property  28 26.92
 Infrastructure 16 15.38
 Trade & services 47 45.19
 Miscellaneous  4 3.85
 Total 104 100.00
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the study 
are shown in Table 2. The average score for the dependent 
variable, the level of voluntary disclosure, is 48.6% with 
the highest level of 80.8% and the lowest level of 25.6%. 
This result is comparable to a study by Nugrahadi (2008) 
who reported an average score of 40.19% for level of 
voluntary disclosure in Indonesia for 2005. The increase 
in disclosure level suggests that there is generally an 
effort by companies to increase voluntarily disclosure, 
although disclosure of such information is not required 
by the BAPEPAM. 
TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics of variables
 Variables Mean Median SD Minimum Maximum
 DiscIndex  0.486 0.487 0.106 0.256 0.808
 InBOC  0.407 0.400 0.162 0.000 1.000
 FmBOC 0.584 0.600 0.166 0.000 1.000
 MgtOwn  0.002 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.190
 Size 13.238 13.475 2.307 8.180 18.33
 Profit  0.035 0.050 0.293 -2.120 0.620
 Leverage  0.413 0.420 0.313 0.001 2.160
Notes: Abbreviations DiscIndex = voluntary disclosure index, InBOC = composition of independent directors, 
FmBOC = composition of family member in the BOC, MgtOwn = managerial ownership, Size = total 
assets, Profit = net profit after tax/sales, and Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. 
Chapter 8.indd   88 2/24/2014   3:46:32 PM
89Corporate Governance and Voluntary Disclosure Practices
TABLE 3.  Samples audited by Big 4 and Non Big 4 audit firms
 Type of Auditors Frequency Percentage
 Big 4 30 28.85
 Non Big 4 74 71.15
 Total 104 100
The average score for composition of independent 
members sitting on the BOC is 40.7% with the maximum 
and minimum score of 100% and 0%, respectively. 
This means that about 40.7% of the BOC members are 
independent commissioners while the rest are affiliated 
commissioners, who may have family or business ties 
with major shareholders of the companies or with the 
companies. This is confirmed by the composition of 
family members on the BOC which records an average of 
58.4%. The lowest value of 0% indicates that there are 
companies with all non-independent members in the BOC 
while the highest score of 100% indicates that there are 
companies with all independent members on the BOC. 
Managerial ownership in Indonesian companies is very 
low with an average of only 0.2%. The highest and lowest 
percentage of managerial shareholdings is 19% and 0%, 
respectively. 
The average scores for control variables are 13.283 
for size, 3.5% for profitability and 41.3% for leverage. 
Table 3 shows 30 companies (28.85%) are audited by Big 
4 audit firms while the remaining 74 companies (71.15%) 
are audited by the Non Big 4 audit firm. 
The data are examined for normality and 
multicollinearity problems prior to regression analysis. All 
variables are examined for extreme values by analyzing 
their scatter plots and values of skewness, kurtosis, 
and standard deviations to test for normality. Based on 
the analysis, only two variables; the level of voluntary 
disclosure and company size are found to be normally 
distributed. Replacement of extreme values with the next 
value in the sequence as suggested by Tabachnik and Fidell 
(2001) is carried out to solve the normality problem of the 
variables. Pearson correlation result as depicted in Table 4 
shows a high correlation of -0.942 between independence 
of BOC and family members on BOC. This value exceeds 
the cutoff point of 0.9 as suggested by Tabachnik and 
Fidell (2001). 
TABLE 4. Pearson correlation results
  DiscIndex InBOC FmBOC AUDIT MgtOwn  Size Profit Leverage
 DiscIndex  1       
 InBOC  0.128 1      
 FmBOC -0.177 -0.942** 1     
 Audit 0.339* -0.059 0.037 1    
 MgtOwn  0.115 -0.006 -0.227 -0.069 1   
 Size 0.393** -0.014 0.038 0.247 0.115* 1  
 Profit  0.020* 0.048 -0.077 0.231* 0.039* 0.043* 1 
 Leverage  0.096 0.028 -0.047 0.142* 0.118 0.091 -0.011 1
Notes: Abbreviations Disc Index = voluntary disclosure index, InBOC = composition of independent directors, FmBOC = 
composition of family member in the BOC, MgtOwn = managerial ownership, Size = total assets, Profit = net profit 
after tax/sales, and Leverage = total liabilities/total assets. 
To overcome this problem and to answer the 
research objective, the two highly correlated variables are 
separated and tested in two different regressions. In the 
first regression analysis (Model 1), the FmBOC variable 
is omitted, while in the second regression (Model 2), the 
InBOC variable is omitted. This method enables us to test 
for the acceptance and rejection of both hypotheses. 
The result of the two regression analysis is presented 
in Table 5. In general the results show that three tested 
variables (independence of BOC, family member on BOC, 
auditor quality) have significant relationships with the 
level of voluntary disclosure. The managerial ownership 
variable is found to have no influence on the level of 
voluntary disclosure.
The positive and significant effect of the variable 
independence of BOC (p = 0.098), provides a moderate 
support for H1. This suggests that the more independent 
the BOC the better the level of voluntary disclosure. The 
finding is consistent with Ho and Wong (2001), Barakko 
et al. (2006), and Donelly and Mulcahy (2008) who 
find a positive and significant relationship between the 
compositions of independent BOD members and the level 
of voluntary disclosure. The results imply that independent 
BOC members on the board enables the board to execute 
its role more effectively by demanding greater voluntary 
disclosure by management (Chen & Jaggi 2000; Ghazali 
& Weetman 2006), thus reducing information asymmetry 
and agency problems. This phenomenon should be 
more apparent in Indonesia since all BOC members are 
non-executive. Therefore, BOC members are expected 
to provide more effective monitoring compared to 
BOD members in a one tier board system. Additionally, 
this finding is also consistent with the agency theory 
suggestion that corporate governance practices serve as a 
complement to the level of voluntary disclosure. Meaning, 
companies that practices good governance (for example, 
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TABLE 5. Results of regression analysis
  Model 1 Model 2
 Variable Coefficient  (t value) Coefficient (t value)
 Constant 0.217 (3.511)*** .338 (5.299)
 InBOC 0.148 (1.672)* -
 FmBOC - -.123 (-2.141) **
 Audit 0.261 (2.698)** .066 (3.048) **
 MgtOwn -0.020 (-0.216) .309 (.604)
 Size 0.329 (3.557)*** .015 (3.574)***
 Profit -0.034 (0.366) -.028 (-.850)
 Leverage  0.069 (0.753) .003 (.105)
 F value  5.294 5.813
 Adjusted R²   0.226 .219
Notes: 
Model 1; DiscIndex = β0 + β1InBOC + β3Audit + β4MgtOwn + β5Size + β6 Profit + 
β7Leverage + ε; 
Model 2; DiscIndex = β0 + β2FmBOC + β3Audit + β4MgtOwn + β5Size + β6 Profit + 
β7Leverage + ε; All variables are as defined in Tables 2 and 4. Asterisk *** significant 
at 0.001, ** significant at 0.05, and * significant  at 0.1
have higher independent BOD/BOC), would also have a 
high level of voluntary disclosure (Ho & Wong 2001). The 
positive relationship between independence of BOC and the 
level of voluntary disclosure indicates that independent 
board members serve as a complement to the high level 
of voluntary disclosure.
The results also show that family membership on 
the board has significantly and negatively influenced the 
level of voluntary disclosure (p = 0.035). This finding 
is consistent with finding from previous studies that 
proposed family members can have easier access to 
internal information. Therefore, the need for additional 
reporting and disclosure will be less (Haniffa & Cooke 
2002). This result has provided a justification to support 
H3.
The audit quality shows a positive and significant 
influence on the level of voluntary disclosure, in both 
Models 1 and 2. This indicates that disclosure by 
companies that are audited by Big 4 audit firms is higher 
compared to disclosure by companies that are audited by 
Non Big 4 audit firm. This finding indicates that quality 
audit serve as a complementary role to enhance corporate 
governance mechanism to increase the level of voluntary 
disclosure (Ho & Wong 2001). This finding is consistent 
with Gul and Leung (2004), Agca and Onder (2007), Wang 
et al. (2008), and O'Sullivan et al. (2008). Gul and Leung 
(2004) also suggest that auditors who are concerned about 
preserving their reputation will strongly encourage clients 
to provide a more comprehensive disclosure. Therefore, 
H2 is supported.
The effect of managerial ownership on the level of 
voluntary disclosure is found to be insignificant. This 
implies that hypothesis H3 is not supported. The direction 
of the relationship, however, supports the findings by Eng 
and Mak (2003) who find that managerial ownership has 
a negative and significant effect on the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Findings by Eng and Mak (2003) are based 
on agency theory that suggests that voluntary disclosure 
levels are low when managerial ownership is high. 
Sabariah (2007) suggests that voluntary information in 
annual reports is under the discretion of the management. 
There will be less need for detail reporting when managers 
have considerable percentage of ownership in companies, 
as they can get the needed information directly from the 
organization. The insignificant result could be due to the 
very low level of managerial ownership in Indonesian 
companies, in line with the findings of Nugrahadi 
(2008).
Of the three control variables included in this study, 
only size shows a positive and significant (p < 0.001) 
influence. The result suggests that those bigger companies 
would be more likely provide higher level of voluntary 
disclosure. This finding supports previous findings by Ho 
and Wong (2001), Eng and Mak (2003), Gul and Leung 
(2004), Arcay and Vazquez (2005), Barako et al. (2006), 
and Donelly and Mulcahy (2008). 
Another control variable, profitability, shows 
a negative but insignificant influence on voluntary 
disclosure which is consistent with Chau and Gray (2002), 
Eng and Mak (2003), Alsaeed (2006), Barako et al. (2006) 
and Nugrahadi (2008) but inconsistent with Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), Agca and Onder (2007), Gul and Leung 
(2004) and Wang et al. (2008) who find a positive and 
significant relationship. The negative and insignificant 
relationship can be due to lack of awareness among 
companies in developing economy to provide additional 
disclosure beyond what is required by the regulation. 
Additionally, financially poor companies tend to disclose 
more information to balance the negative effect from the 
poor performance (Sabariah 2007). Finally, leverage is 
found to have a positive but insignificant relationship 
with the level of disclosure, consistent with Ho and Wong 
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(2001), Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Chau and Gray 
(2002), Eng and Mak (2003) and Wang et al. (2006). 
This positive relationship shows the high agency cost 
companies tend to disclose more in order to reduce agency 
problem.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The main issue of this study is the effect of corporate 
governance mechanism on the level of voluntary 
disclosure in Indonesia, a country that adopts a two 
tier board system. Members of the BOC in a two tier 
board systems can exercise more control to monitor 
the performance of management since they are all non-
executives. This scenario is in contrast to members of the 
BOD in a one tier board system since board members can 
be executive and non-executive members. The conflicting 
role can jeopardize the board’s independence to evaluate 
the performance of the management (executive) since the 
board members are also a part of the management team. 
The corporate governance factors examined in 
this study are the independent composition of the BOC, 
the composition of family members on the BOC, audit 
quality, and managerial ownership. This study predicts 
that the independent composition of BOC should strongly 
influence the voluntary disclosure level since members 
are considered more objective to execute their role as the 
monitoring mechanism of management actions. The results 
of the study show that the relationship has been moderate 
(p = 0.098). It indicates that although BOC members are 
not allowed to hold any executive post in a company that 
does not stop them to get involved in matters related the 
operation of companies. There are cases in which BOC 
members are next of kin or have business associations 
with major shareholders or with the companies. This 
is confirmed by the percentage composition of family 
members on the BOC at 58.4%. Therefore, the regulatory 
bodies in Indonesia need to reexamine and reconsider the 
current laws and regulations to ensure the BOC members 
are truly ‘independent’ so the members can effectively 
and objectively monitor performance of the executive 
managers.
The result also shows that audit quality has a positive 
and significant relationship with the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Meanwhile, tested separately, the level of 
family members on the board has influenced the disclosure 
negatively. The managerial ownership variable also 
shows a negative relationship, as hypothesized, but the 
relationship is not significant.
Further study needs to investigate in greater detail 
the relationship of managerial ownership and the level 
of disclosure. Currently, the level of managerial direct 
ownership is very low. However, as suggested by 
Nugrahadi (2008) the total direct and indirect ownership 
by management might be very high which could 
substantially influence the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Another option for future research is to further examine 
the effect of family ownership on the level of voluntary 
disclosure as Indonesia has been identified as one of the 
country with the highest family controlled firms in the 
world. This study employed sample of companies for the 
year of 2008 only and this may limit the generalization 
of the findings. Therefore, future research should be 
conducted longitudinally to incorporate many years of 
study and get better understanding of the research issue. 
ENDNOTES
1 Three of the selected annual reports are of companies that 
won the Annual Report Award (ARA) in 2008. The other 
three annual reports are of the companies that have been 
used in the study by International Standards of Accounting 
and Reporting (UNTACD 2008) and a further four annual 
reports are obtained from four main industries in Indonesia 
(manufacturing, hospitality, transportation and supermarket 
centers).
2 Please refer to the authors for the final list of disclosure 
items. 
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